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Abstract
We introduce a number of privacy definitions for the multi-armed bandit problem,
based on differential privacy. We relate them through a unifying graphical model
representation and connect them to existing definitions. We then derive and con-
trast lower bounds on the regret of bandit algorithms satisfying these definitions.
We show that for all of them, the learner’s regret is increased by a multiplicative
factor dependent on the privacy level ǫ, but that the dependency is weaker when
we do not require local differential privacy for the rewards.
1 Introduction
Multi-armed Bandits. The stochastic K-armed bandit problem (Bellman, 1956;
Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018) involves a learner sequentially choosing among K different
arms so as to maximise her expected cumulative reward. More precisely, At time t, the algorithm
draws an arm At = a ∈ [K] and the arms generate rewards rt = [rt,j ]Kj=1 ∈ RK . Then the learner
obtains reward Xt = rt,a, without observing the other rewards.
In the stochastic bandit problem, the environment ν where the learner is acting consists of a set
of reward distributions {f1, . . . , fK} with means µa , E(fa), and optimal expected reward µ∗ ,
maxa µa so that the reward distribution for each arm is Pν(Xt = rt,a) = fa for all t.
The learner’s policy π for selecting actions is generally a stochastic mapping π : H → ∆([K]).
Here H is the observed history, i.e. the sequence of actions taken and rewards obtained by the
learner. The objective is to policy maximise the expected cumulative reward,
S(π, ν, T ) ,
T∑
t=1
E
ν
π [Xt] =
K∑
a=1
E
ν
π [Na(T )]µa,
where Na(T ) denotes the number of time arm a is pulled till time step T and µa is the expected
reward of the arm a. The quality of a learning algorithm π is best summarised by its (expected
cumulative) regret, i.e. its loss in total reward relative to an oracle that knows ν:
Reg(π, ν, T ) ,
K∑
a=1
E
ν
π [Na(T )] (µ
∗ − µa).
This is the cost incurred by the algorithm due to the incomplete information, as it has to play the sub-
optimal arms to gain information about the suboptimal arms. This process decreases the uncertainty
in decision making and facilitates maximisation of the expected cumulative reward.
Lower Bounds on Regret. Lower bounds illustrate the inherent hardness of bandit problems.
Lai and Robbins (1985) proved that any consistent bandit policy π must incur at least logarithmic
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growth in expected cumulative regret. This lower bound is problem-dependent as it has a multiplica-
tive factor dependent on the given environment ν. Vogel (1960) proved an environment-independent
lower bound of Ω(
√
KT ). This also called a problem-independent minimax lower bound as the min-
imax regret is as Regminimax(T ) , minπ maxν Reg(π, ν, T ). A similar lower bound of Ω(
√
KT )
is established for the Bayesian regret under any prior (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018). A detailed
description of the existing lower bounds is provided in Section 4.
Differential Privacy is a rigorous and highly successful definition of algorithmic privacy intro-
duced by Dwork et al. (2006). Given a definition of neighbourhood between possible inputs to an
algorithm, it differential privacy allows us to design algorithms which maintain data privacy by en-
suring that the algorithm’s output renders neighbouring inputs indistinguishable. Informally, if an
algorithm is ǫ-differentially private, then the amount of information that inferred by an adversary
about the algorithm’s input is bounded by ǫ.
One specific way to implement differential privacy is to ensure that the input to the algorithm is
already a differentially private version of the original data. This notion of privacy is called local
differential privacy (Duchi et al., 2013), and it allows the algorithm to be agnostic about privacy.
For this reason, this notion is presently adapted by Apple and Google for their large-scale systems.
Our contributions. In Section 2, we define, discuss, and unify different notions of differential
privacy. In particular, we examine the effect of considering different notions of private input, ob-
servable output and neighbourhoods on the regret of multi-armed bandits that are operating under a
differential privacy constraint. We illustrate the differences between those definitions using graphi-
cal models. This graphical model definition also invokes a new notion of privacy in bandits.
In Section 3, we provide a unified framework to prove minimax lower bounds for both differentially
private multi-armed bandits. This is based on a generalised KL-divergence decomposition lemma
adapted for local and standard differential privacy definitions. Though the literature consists of
problem-dependent regret bounds, these are the first minimax and Bayesian regret bounds for both
differentially private bandits. We show that both in general and when differential privacy is achieved
using a local mechanism, the regret scales as a multiplicative factor of ǫ. As expected, local privacy
mechanisms have a slightly worse performance. Note that our results do not contradict the upper
bound of Tossou and Dimitrakakis (2016), since they achieve an additive regret loss with respect to
instantaneous privacy, rather than the stricter sequential privacy definition that a constant privacy
loss can be achieved with only an additive term on the regret cannot be true.
In Section 4, we elaborate that the proposed lower bounds pose several open problems of designing
optimal bandit algorithms that satisfy different notions of privacy.
2 Differential Privacy for Bandits
Local Differential Privacy. There is a stronger notion of privacy proposed by Duchi et al. (2013),
called local privacy, where the user does not trust the authority of the algorithm. Instead, she uses a
privacy-preserving mechanismM to send locally differentially private inputs to the algorithm.
Definition 1 ǫ-Local Differential Privacy (Duchi et al., 2013). A local privacy-preserving mecha-
nismM is ǫ-local differentially private if for all privatised inputsZ ⊆ Range(M) and neighbouring
input datasetsD,D′ ∈ D with Hamming distance dH (D,D′) = 1:
log
(∣∣∣∣ PM(Z | D)PM(Z | D′)
∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫ.
Local Differential Privacy for Bandits. If the bandit algorithm only observes a private version of
the reward sequence, then the algorithm’s output is differentially private with respect to the gener-
ated reward sequence {r1, . . . , rT } = {ri}Ti=1.
Definition 2 ǫ-Local Private Reward Sequence for Bandits. A mechanism M preserves local
privacy for rewards if
log
(∣∣∣∣PM(Z | {ri}Ti=1)
PM(Z | {r′i}Ti=1)
∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫ,
for all privatised reward sequences Z ∈ RKT and generated reward sequences {ri}Ti=1, {r′i}Ti=1 ∈
R
KT with Hamming distance dH
({ri}Ti=1, {r′i}Ti=1) = 1.
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Figure 1: Graphical models for non-private, local private, sequential private, and environment private
multi-armed bandits.
Definition 2 is analogous to the local privacy definition in the corrupted bandit setting of Gajane et al.
(2017) but generalises the notion of privacy from obtained rewards to the generated rewards.
Differential Privacy. Dwork et al. (2014) proposed the notion of ǫ-differential privacy for a given
dataset D belonging to a corpus D and an algorithm π equipped with a privacy preserving mecha-
nismM on top of it. This definition of differential privacy aims to keep the input dataset D private
from an adversary that can access only the privatised outputs Z of the privacy-preserving algorithm
M◦ π.
Definition 3 ǫ-Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014). A privacy-preserving mechanism M
composed with an algorithm π is ǫ-differentially private if for all Z ⊆ Range(M) and D,D′ ∈ D
such thatD ∼ D′:
log
(∣∣∣∣ P((M◦ π)(D) ∈ Z)P((M◦ π)(D′) ∈ Z)
∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫ.
In the notion of differential privacy, the algorithm π gets the input accurately and the privacy preserv-
ing mechanism is applied inside it or on its output. A privacy-preserving algorithmM◦ π provides
perfect privacy (ǫ = 0) if it yields indistinguishable outputs for all neighbouring input datasets. The
privacy level ǫ quantifies the privacy guarantee provided by ǫ-differential privacy. A smaller value
of privacy level ǫ indicates higher privacy.
Differential Privacy for Bandits. In case of sequential decision making problems like bandit, the
notion of privacy and neighbouring dataset can be defined in several ways. We discuss them in the
following section.
Case 1: We consider the generated history hT of a privacy-preserving bandit algorithm π at time
T as the input dataset. Here, generated history gT , {(ai, ri)}Ti=1 is defined as the set of actions
chosen and all the rewards generated till time T . Now, we can define a neighbouring input dataset
i.e. a neighbouring generated history in two ways:
1.1. In the case 1.1., a neighbouring generated history differs from a given generated history by one of
the actions but all the generated rewards are the same such that gAT , {(a′1, r1)} ∪ {(ai, ri)}Ti=2.
1.2. In the case 1.2., a neighbouring generated history differs from a given generated history by one of
the generated rewards but all the actions are the same such that gRT , {(a1, r′1)} ∪ {(ai, ri)}Ti=2.
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We consider the action selected at time AT+1 as the output. These notions of input dataset, neigh-
bouring datasets, and output allow us to formulate two definitions of differential privacy.
Definition 4 Privacy for Bandits in Case 1.1. (ǫ-Pan-privacy). A privacy-preserving bandit algo-
rithm π is ǫ-pan private if for all actions taken AT+1 ∈ [K] and neighbouring generated histories
gT , g
A
T ∈ ([K]× RK)T :
log
(∣∣∣∣∣ Pπ (AT+1 ∈ [K] | gT )Pπ (AT+1 ∈ [K] | gAT )
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫ.
Definition 5 Privacy for Bandits in Case 1.2. (ǫ-Instantaneous Privacy). A privacy-preserving
bandit algorithm π is ǫ-instantaneous private if for all actions taken AT+1 ∈ [K] and neighbouring
generated histories gT , g
R
T ∈ ([K]× RK)T :
log
(∣∣∣∣∣ Pπ (AT+1 ∈ [K] | gT )Pπ (AT+1 ∈ [K] | gRT )
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫ.
Definition 4 is analogous to the definition of pan-privacy (Dwork et al., 2010) as the notion of
neighbouring histories in Case 1.1 and neighbouring input datasets in pan-privacy (Definition 3
in (Mir et al., 2010)) are identical. Our notion also generalises the pan-privacy to bandit setup as the
pan-privacy considers only the obtained reward sequence as the input and secures it but we consider
the generated reward sequence as the input which is a superset of the obtained reward. Hereafter,
we refer to Definition 4 as the pan-privacy for bandits. Definition 5 is analogous to the definition of
differential privacy used in (Tossou and Dimitrakakis, 2016). We refer to Definition 5 as the instan-
taneous privacy for bandits. The joint differential privacy definition proposed by Shariff and Sheffet
(2018) is reducible to either Definition 4 or 5 depending on the notion of neighbouring dataset. Our
definitions generalise all these definitions as they depend only on the obtained rewards.
Case 2: We consider the sequence of generated rewards till time T , i.e. {ri}Ti=1 ∈ RKT as the
input dataset and the sequence of actions taken till time T , i.e. {ai}Ti=1 ∈ [K]T as the output
dataset. Thus, analogous to the local differential privacy for bandits, we define two generated reward
sequences {ri}Ti=1 and {r′i}Ti=1 to be neighbouring if their Hamming distance is 1. Now, we define
the corresponding global privacy and refer to it as the sequential privacy.
Definition 6 ǫ-Sequential Privacy for Bandits. A privacy-preserving bandit algorithm π preserves
ǫ-sequential differential privacy if for all action sequences {ai}Ti=1 ∈ [K]T and neighbouring gen-
erated reward sequences {ri}Ti=1, {r′i}Ti=1 ∈ RKT ,
log
(∣∣∣∣∣Pπ
({ai}Ti=1 ∈ [K]T | {ri}Ti=1)
Pπ
({ai}Ti=1 ∈ [K]T | {r′i}Ti=1)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫ.
We limit ourselves to the study of sequential privacy here, which is equivalent to the definition given
in (Tossou and Dimitrakakis, 2017). This is because an algorithm satisfying sequential privacy at
level ǫ also satisfies instantaneous privacy (Definition 5) with privacy level 2ǫ. More precisely:
Lemma 1. If a policy π satisfies sequential privacy (Definition 6) with privacy level ǫ, π will also
satisfy instantaneous privacy (Definition 5) with privacy level 2ǫ. Conversely, if a policy satisfies ǫ
instantaneous privacy, it only achieves tǫ sequential privacy after t steps.
Discussion. We obtain a unified framework for privacy in bandits as sequential differential privacy
(Definition 6) and the local differential privacy (Definition 2) adopt the same notion of input dataset
and neighbouring dataset. We observe that sequential differential privacy also ensures the instan-
taneous differential privacy (Definition 5). The other definition of privacy (Definition 4) being the
pan-privacy for bandits does not ensure differential privacy for more than one observation by the
adversary (Dwork et al., 2010). On contrary, sequential differential privacy (Definition 6) ensures
differential privacy under continuous observation. This property is desired in the sequential setting
of bandits. Additionally, Definition 4 of differential privacy imposes a constraint on the actions taken
by the bandit algorithm. This may lead to a narrower space of feasible bandit algorithms which is
not desired from the algorithm design perspective.
Unified Graphical Model Representation of Privacy for Bandits. Figure 2 provides a unified
graphical model perspective of non-private, private (locally and not) multi-armed bandits. The
shaded nodes represent the observed variable. The clear nodes represent the hidden variables. The
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dashed-rectangle covers the input quantities with respect to which the privacy has to be maintained.
All of these representations treat the generated rewards as input and all possible action sequences
as output with local and sequential privacy-mechanisms acting at two different levels ensuring local
and sequential privacies respectively. This representation allows us to define a new notion of privacy
for bandits, namely environment privacy.
Environment Privacy for Bandits. For a bandit with a stationary environment ν, the reward gen-
eration mechanism can be represented as a distribution with an environment-dependent parameter
ν. The user may consider this environment parameter to be the input and the generated histories
gT , i.e. the sequence of generated rewards {ri}Ti=1 ∈ RKT and actions taken {ai}Ti=1 ∈ [K]T by
environment parameter ν and the policy π as the output.
Definition 7 ǫ-Environment Privacy for Bandits. A privacy-preserving mechanismM preserves
ǫ-environment privacy if for all generated histories gT , {(ai, ri)}Ti=1 ∈ ([K] × RK)T , and envi-
ronment parameters ν, ν′ ∈ Rd,
log
(∣∣∣∣∣ Pπν
({(ai, ri)}Ti=1 | ν)
Pπν′
({(ai, ri)}Ti=1 | ν′)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ ǫρ(ν, ν′),
where ρ is a distance metric defined in the space of ν.
Example. In order to understand how each definition affects privacy, consider the example of web
advertising for a specific individual. In this example, at time t the individual is presented with some
set of advertisements at. These advertisements generate potential responses rt. Out of these gener-
ated responses of the user, we only see the clicked response xt. Let us assume that we use a bandit
algorithm π in order to perform adaptive web adverstising. If π is ǫ-sequential private (Definition 6)
with respect to {rt}, an adversary cannot distinguish similar responses between individuals. If we
are locally ǫ-sequential-DP (Definition 2), even the authority of the algorithm would not be able
to distinguish between {rt}. Thus indistinguishability of individuals can be achieved for both the
adversary and the authority of the algorithm. Finally, if we are ǫ-envrionment private with respect
to ν (Definition 7), no adversary can infer the inherent preferences of the individual. For all of our
definitions, the privacy loss is bounded by a constant privacy level ǫ independent of the length of
interactions.
3 Regret Lower Bounds for Private Bandits
Lower bounds on the performance measure of a problem provides us insight about the intrinsic
hardness of the problem and sets a target for optimal algorithm design. In this section, we prove
minimax and Bayesian lower bounds for local and sequential private bandits respectively. We also
prove a problem-dependent lower bound for local privacy.
In order to prove the lower bounds, we adopt the general canonical bandit
model (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018) that is general enough not to impose additional con-
straints on the bandit algorithm and the environment. A privacy-preserving bandit algorithm
π and an environment ν interacts up to a given time horizon T to produce observed history
HT , {(Ai, Xi)}Ti=1. Thus, an observed history HT is a random variable sampled from the
measurable space
(
([K]× R)T ,B([K]× R)T ) and a probability measure Pπν . Here, B([K]×R)T
is the Borel set on ([K] × R)T . Pπν is the probability measure induced by the algorithm π and
environment ν such that,
1. the probability of choosing an action At = a at time t is dictated only by the algorithm
π(a|Ht−1),
2. the distribution of reward Xt is fAt and is conditionally independent of the previous observed
historyHt−1.
Hence, we get for any observed historyHT ,
P
T
πν , Pπν(HT ) =
T∏
t=1
π(At|Ht−1)fAt(Xt). (1)
This canonical bandit framework allows us to state Lemma 2 that further leads to Lemma 3 and 4
for local and sequential privacy respectively.
Lemma 2 KL-divergence Decomposition. Given a bandit algorithm π, two environments ν1 and
ν2, and a probability measure Pπν satisfying Equation 1,
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D
(
P
T
πν1 ‖PTπν2
)
=
T∑
t=1
D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2)) +
K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )]D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2) .
For non-private and locally-private algorithms, the first term vanishes and the rest remains. The cor-
responding equality for non-private bandit algorithms was first proposed in (Garivier et al., 2018).
The non-private decomposition of (Garivier et al., 2018) is also used in (Gajane et al., 2017) to de-
rive a regret lower bound for locally private bandits.
3.1 Lower Bounds for Local Privacy
Lemma 3 Local Private KL-divergence Decomposition. If the reward generation process is ǫ-
local differentially private for both the environments ν1 and ν2,
D
(
P
T
ν1π ‖PTν2π
) ≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2 K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )]D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2) . (2)
Theorem 1 Local Private Minimax Regret Bound. Given an ǫ-locally private reward generation
mechanism with ǫ ∈ R, and a time horizon T ≥ g(K, ǫ), then for any environment with finite
variance, any algorithm π satisfies
Regminimax(T ) ≥
c
min{2, eǫ}(eǫ − 1)
√
(K − 1)T . (3)
For small ǫ, eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. Thus, for small ǫ, the minimax regret bound for local privacy worsens by a
multiplicative factor 1ǫeǫ . If the ǫ = 0 which means the rewards obtained are completely randomised,
the arms would not be separable any more and would lead to unbounded minimax regret.
Following this, we establish a lower bound for Bayesian regret of local private bandits. In the
Bayesian setup, the bandit algorithm assumes a prior distribution Q0 over the possible environ-
ments ν ∈ E . As the algorithm π plays further and observe corresponding rewards at each
time t, it updates the prior over the possible environments to a posterior distribution Qt. This
framework is adopted for efficient algorithms like Thompson sampling (Thompson, 1933) and
Gittins indices (Gittins et al., 1989). In the Bayesian setting, we define the Bayesian regret as
RegBayes(π, T,Q) ,
∫
νT
Reg(π, ν, T )dQ(ν). Bayesian regret is a weaker measure than minimax
regret as Bayesian regret is the average regret over believed environments whereas minimax regret
is the worst-case regret. Bayesian minimax regret Lattimore and Szepesvári (2018) is defined as the
worst possible Bayesian regret for any prior: Reg∗Bayes(T ) , minπ maxQ RegBayes(π, T,Q).
Corollary 1 Local Private Bayesian Minimax Regret Bound. Given an ǫ-locally private reward
generation mechanism with ǫ ∈ R, and a finite time horizon T ≥ g(K, ǫ), then for any environment
with bounded rewards r ∈ [0, 1]K , any algorithm π satisfies
Reg∗Bayes(T ) ≥
c
min{2, eǫ}(eǫ − 1)
√
(K − 1)T . (4)
Both minimax and Bayesian minimax regret bounds are problem independent. They represent the
worst-case regret for any environment and any prior over environments respectively. Someone may
want to design algorithms that is optimal for a given environment ν and the minimax and Bayesian
minimax bounds are too pessimistic for them. Thus, researchers study the problem-dependent lower
bounds of regret involving environment dependent quantities. Lai and Robbins (1985) proved that
a bandit algorithm achieves Ω(logT ) problem-dependent lower bound. We prove that for ǫ-local
privacy this lower bound worsens by a multiplicative factor 1e2ǫ(eǫ−1)2 .
Theorem 2 Problem-dependent Local-Private Regret Bound. For any asymptotically consistent
bandit algorithm π, an environment ν with optimal reward distribution f∗, and an ǫ-locally private
reward generation mechanism, the expected cumulative regret
lim inf
T→∞
Reg(π, ν, T )
logT
≥
∑
a 6=a∗
∆a
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2D (fa ‖ f∗) . (5)
3.2 Lower Bounds for Sequential Privacy
Lemma 4 Sequential Private KL-divergence Decomposition. For a sequentially private bandit
algorithm π satisfying l(T ) ≤ Eπν [Na(T )] for any arm a, and two environments ν1 and ν2,
D
(
P
T
πν1 ‖PTπν2
) ≤ 2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)1− 2e− Tl(T )
1− e− Tl(T )
+
K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )] (D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2)). (6)
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Theorem 3 Sequential Private Minimax Regret Bound. Given a finite privacy level ǫ ≤ a/2, and
a time horizon T ≥ h(K, ǫ), then for any environment with finite variance, any algorithm π that is
ǫ-sequential private satisfies
Regminimax(T ) ≥ c(a)
√
(K − 1)T
2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) . (7)
This implies that for small ǫ, the minimax regret bound for sequential privacy worsens by a multi-
plicative factor 1ǫ . Thus, the lower bound of minimax regret for sequentially private bandit is better
than the locally private bandit by factors eǫ/2 and
√
2
ǫ(eǫ+1) for small and large ǫ’s respectively.
Corollary 2 Sequential Private Bayesian Minimax Regret Bound. Given a finite privacy level
ǫ ∈ R, and a finite time horizon T ≥ h(K, ǫ), then for any environment with finite variance and
bounded reward r ∈ [0, 1]K , any algorithm π that is ǫ-sequential private satisfies
Reg∗Bayes(T ) ≥ c(ǫ)
√
(K − 1)T
2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) . (8)
Discussion. This shows that for both local and sequential privacy for bandits the regret lower bound
changes by a multiplicative factor dependent on the privacy level ǫ. The bounds also show that
the lower bound for local privacy is worse than that for sequential privacy. This shows learning
from randomised reward in local privacy is inherently harder to learn than to use sequential privacy
inducing policy. In Section 4, we discuss that our lower bounds falsify the conjecture of additive
factor in the lower bound by Tossou and Dimitrakakis (2016) and discovers existing gaps in optimal
algorithm design for local and sequential private bandits.
4 Existing Lower Bounds for Non-private and Private Bandits
Problem-independent Non-private Lower Bounds: Minimax regret is the worst case regret that a
bandit algorithm can incur if the environment is unknown. Thus, it is often referred as the problem-
independent regret. Vogel (1960) performed the first minimax analysis of two-armed Bernoulli ban-
dits. Auer et al. (2002) generalised it to K-arm Bernoulli distributions. Gerchinovitz and Lattimore
(2016) provided a novel technique to establish high probability regret lower bounds for adversar-
ial bandits with bounded reward. For any bandit algorithm, the minimax regret is lower bounded
by Regminimax(T ) ≥ c
√
(K − 1)T . A bandit algorithm π is called minimax optimal if its min-
imax regret is upper bounded by C
√
(K − 1)T . In the Bayesian setup, the bandit algorithm as-
sumes a prior distribution Q0 over the possible environments ν ∈ E . Lattimore and Szepesvári
(2018) proved that for any bandit algorithm π there exists a prior distribution Q0 that the Bayesian
regret RegBayes(T ) ≥ C
√
KT . This indicates that the minimax regret and the Bayesian re-
gret lower bounds are identical for non-private bandits. This also holds for private bandits.
Lattimore and Szepesvári (2019) provides the reasoning behind this connection using a modified
minimax theorem.
Existing Lower Bounds for Differentially Private Bandits. Mishra and Thakurta (2015) proposed
differentially private variants of UCB and Thompson sampling algorithms. Tossou and Dimitrakakis
(2016) improved the differentially private variant of UCB algorithm to obtain regret upper bound of
Ω(
∑
a 6=a∗
∆a
D(fa ‖ f∗) logT+
1
ǫ ) for instantaneous privacy with time varying privacy loss. Our results
show that the stricter sequential privacy definition that a constant privacy loss can be achieved with
only an additive term on the regret cannot be true. Shariff and Sheffet (2018) proves a finite-time
problem-dependent lower bound for contextual bandits. It indicates that the finite-time lower bound
of regret is Ω(log T ) like the non-private lower bounds but with a modified multiplicative factor
(
∑
a 6=a∗
∆a
D(fa ‖ f∗) +
K
ǫ ). Though their definition of privacy is a bit ambiguous as it can be reduced
to either of Definition 4 and 5. Among them, the first being unsuitable for continual observation
defeats the purpose for bandits. We try to clarify at this point with the pan, instantaneous, and
sequential privacy definitions.
Gajane et al. (2017) uses an analogous local privacy definition. They proved a finite-time problem-
dependent lower bound of regret for locally private multi-armed bandits where the local privacy is
induced by the corrupt bandit mechanism. In this case also, theΩ(logT ) regret bound of non-private
bandits is maintaines with a modified multiplicative factor
∑
a 6=a∗
∆a
D(ga ‖ g∗) . Here, ga and g
∗ are
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the corrupt versions of the reward distributions fa and f
∗ ensuring ǫ-local privacy. Theorem 2 shows
that the algorithms they have proposed, namely kl-UCB-CF and TS-CF, are suboptimal by at least by
a factor (1+ e−ǫ)2. This opens up the problem of designing optimal local-private bandit algorithms.
We are not aware of any problem-independent minimax lower bounds for (locally and standard)
differentially private bandits, before this paper. Tossou and Dimitrakakis (2017) proposed a differ-
entially private variant of EXP3 algorithm that achieves privacy for adversarial bandits with regret
upper bound O(
√
T log T
ǫ ). The lower bound of Theorem 3 shows that designing an optimal private
algorithm for adversarial bandits is an open problem.
5 Discussion and Future Work
Our definitions of sequential differential privacy provide a framework to look into differentially
private bandit algorithms. This also resolves the eclectic definitions available in the literature and
discusses their applicability. The KL-divergence decomposition based method provides a unified
proving mechanism for lower bounds for bandit. This allows us to propose the minimax lower
bounds for both locally and standard sequentially private multi-armed bandits which was absent in
literature. These bounds also pose design of optimal local and sequential private bandit algorithms
as open problems since the existing algorithms are suboptimal.
We are now working on deriving the problem-dependent lower bounds for sequentially and environ-
ment private bandits and problem-independent bounds for environment private bandits. In future,
researchers can utilise these bounds to design optimal private bandit algorithms for real-life applica-
tions, such as recommender systems and web advertising.
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A Proofs for Section 2 (Differential Privacy for Bandits)
For simplicity, we write at = {a1, . . . , at} and rt = {r1, . . . , rt} for reward and action sequences
respectively.
Lemma 1. If a policy π satisfies sequential privacy (Definition 6) with privacy level ǫ, π will also
satisfy instantaneous privacy (Definition 5) with privacy level 2ǫ. Conversely, if a policy satisfies ǫ
instantaneous privacy, it only achieves tǫ sequential privacy after t steps.
Proof of Lemma 1. If π is 2ǫ-instantaneous private then (by definition) the following ratio must be
bounded from above by e2ǫ for any two neighbouring reward sequences rt, rˆt :
π(at | at−1, rt−1)
π(at | at−1, rˆt−1) =
π(at | rt−1)
π(at | rˆt−1)
π(at−1 | rˆt−1)
π(at−1 | rt−1) =
π(at | rt−1)
π(at | rˆt−1)
π(at−1 | rˆt−2)
π(at−1 | rt−2) ≤ e
2ǫ,
where the first equality is obtained through the definition of conditional probability, the second
through independence of actions on current rewards, while the final inequality is through assumption
of ǫ-sequential privacy and that r, rˆ are neighbours. The converse follows from composition of
differential privacy.
B Proofs for Section 3 (Regret Lower Bounds for Private Bandits)
First, let us remind ourselves of the chain rule of KL divergence for two probability measures P,Q
on a product space X T for a given T :
D (P ‖Q) ,
∫
XT
ln
dP (xT )
dQ(xT )
dP (xT )
=
∫
XT
ln
d[P (xT | xT−1)P (xT−1)]
d[Q(xT | xx−1)Q(xT−1)] d[P (xT | x
T−1)P (xT−1)]
=
∫
XT
[
ln
dP (xT | xT−1)
dQ(xT | xx−1) + ln
dP (xT−1)
dQ(xT−1)
]
d[P (xT | xT−1)P (xT−1)]
=
∫
XT
ln
dP (xT | xT−1)
dQ(xT | xx−1) dP (x
T ) +
∫
XT−1
ln
dP (xT−1)
dQ(xT−1)
dP (xT−1)
=
T∑
t=1
∫
X t
ln
dP (xt | xt−1)
dQ(xt | xt−1) dP (x
t) =
T∑
t=1
EP (xt−1)
[
D
(
P (xt | xt−1) ‖Q(xt | xt−1)
)]
.
Here, xt denotes the reward at time t and x
t denotes the sequence of rewards obtained from the
beginning to time t, i.e. {x1, . . . , xt}. Now, the conditional KL-divergence is defined here as
D (P (x | y) ‖Q(x | y)) ,
∫
X×Y
ln
dP (x | y)
dQ(x | y) dP (x, y).
Thus, we get the chain rule of KL-divergence
D (P ‖Q) ,
∫
xT∈XT
ln
P (xT )
Q(xT )
dP (xT ) =
T∑
t=1
D
(
P (xt | xt−1) ‖Q(xt | xt−1)
)
. (9)
Lemma 2 KL-divergence Decomposition. Given a bandit algorithm π, two environments ν1 and
ν2, and a probability measure Pπν satisfying Equation 1,
D
(
P
T
πν1 ‖PTπν2
)
=
T∑
t=1
Eπν1 [D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2))] +
K∑
a=1
Eπν1 [Na(T )]D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2) .
(10)
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This style of KL-divergence decomposition appeared in proofs of Auer et al. (2002); Garivier et al.
(2018); Lattimore and Szepesvári (2018). We adopt the proof in our context and notations with
enough generality to proof the differentially private versions of it later.
Proof.
D
(
P
T
πν1 ‖PTπν2
)
=
T∑
t=1
EPT
πν1
[D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2)) +D (f(Xt|At,Ht, ν1) ‖ f(Xt|At,Ht, ν2))]
=
T∑
t=1
EPT
πν1
[D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2))] +
T∑
t=1
EPT
πν1
[
K∑
a=1
1At=aD (fa(Xt) ∈ ν1 ‖ fa(Xt) ∈ ν2)
]
=
T∑
t=1
EPT
πν1
[D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2))] +
K∑
a=1
[
T∑
t=1
EPT
πν1
[1At=a]D (fa(Xt) ∈ ν1 ‖ fa(Xt) ∈ ν2)
]
=
T∑
t=1
EPT
πν1
[D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2))] +
K∑
a=1
EPT
πν1
[Na(T )]D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2) .
The first equality is followed by the chain rule of KL-divergenceand Equation 1. The second equality
is from the conditioning. The third equality is obtained from linearity of expectation. The fourth
equality is from the fact that expectation of an indicator function of an event returns its probability
of occurrence.
B.1 Proofs for Local Privacy
Lemma 3 Locally Private KL-divergence Decomposition. If the reward generation process is
ǫ-local differentially private for both the environments ν1 and ν2,
D
(
P
T
ν1π ‖PTν2π
) ≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2 K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )]D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2) . (11)
Proof. In case of local privacy, the reward observed by the algorithm π is obtained at time t, Xt,
from a privatised version of generated rewards Zt. Thus, xt = zt,a, where a refers to the action
selected at time t. We denote the distribution over the privatised generated reward of arm a as ga(z).
ga(z) is obtained by imposing a local privacy mechanism M on the original reward distribution
fa(z).
We note that the KL-divergence decomposition of Lemma 2 is obtained on the probability space
over observed histories. Since the observed rewards are now coming from ga(z) rather than fa(x),
we begin our derivations of local-private KL-divergence decomposition by substituting ga(z) in
Equation 10. For brevity, we denote g1a and g
2
a to represent the privatised reward distributions for
arm a in environments ν1 and ν2 respectively. Thus,
D
(
P
T
πν1 ‖PTπν2
)
=
T∑
t=1
Eπν1 [D (π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2))] +
K∑
a=1
Eπν1 [Na(T )]D
(
g1a(Z) ‖ g2a(Z)
)
=
K∑
a=1
Eπν1 [Na(T )]D
(
g1a(Z) ‖ g2a(Z)
)
≤
K∑
a=1
Eπν1 [Na(T )]
[
D
(
g1a(Z) ‖ g2a(Z)
)
+D
(
g2a(Z) ‖ g1a(Z)
)]
≤min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2
K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )] ‖ f1a(X)− f2a (X) ‖ 2TV
≤2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2
K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )]D
(
f1a (X) ‖ f2a(X)
)
11
The first step is due to the fact that given the same history, π(At|Ht, ν1) = π(At|Ht, ν2) as they do
not vary with the model and depends only on the internal randomisation of the algorithm π.
The inequality in the second step is derived from non-negativity of KL-
divergence (Cover and Thomas, 2012) and the fact that for two non-negative numbers a and
b, a ≤ a + b. The inequality in the third step is obtained from Theorem 1 in (Duchi et al.,
2013). The last inequality is obtained by applying Pinsker’s inequality (Cover and Thomas, 2012).
Pinsker’s inequality states that for any two distributions P and Q, square of their total variance
distance is upper bounded by 2 times their Kl-divergence: ‖P −Q ‖ 2TV ≤ 2D (P ‖Q).
Theorem 1 Locally PrivateMinimax Regret Bound. Given an ǫ-locally private reward generation
mechanism with ǫ ∈ R, and a time horizon T ≥ g(K, ǫ), then for any environment with finite
variance, any algorithm π satisfies
Regminimax(T ) ≥
c
min{2, eǫ}(eǫ − 1)
√
(K − 1)T . (12)
Proof. Step 1: Fix two environments ν1 and ν2 such that drawing arm 1 in ν1 for more than T/2
times is good but doing the same is bad for ν2.
We define ν1 to be a set of K-reward distribution with mean reward {∆, 0, . . . , 0} and finite Fisher
information I . Similarly, we define ν2 to be to be a set of K-reward distribution with mean reward
{∆, . . . , 0, 2∆} and finite Fisher information I . Drawing arm 1 is the optimal choice in ν1 whereas
drawing armK is the optimal choice in ν2.
Step 2: We get the lower bounds of expected cumulative regret for a policy π, and the environments
ν1 and ν2 as follows:
Reg(π, ν1, T ) ≥ Pπν1 (N1(T ) ≤ T/2)
T∆
2
,
Reg(π, ν2, T ) > Pπν2 (N1(T ) > T/2)
T∆
2
.
Let us denote the eventN1(T ) ≤ T/2 as E. Hence, we get
Reg(π, ν1, T ) + Reg(π, ν2, T ) ≥ T∆
2
(
Pπν1(E) + Pπν2(E
C)
)
≥ T∆
4
exp(−D (Pπν1 ‖Pπν2)).
We obtain the last inequality from the Lemma 2.1 in (Bretagnolle and Huber, 1979). This
is called Bretagnolle-Huber inequality or probabilistic Pinsker’s inequality (Auer et al., 2002;
Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2019) and used for several proofs of bandit algorithms. This states
that for any two distributions P and Q defined on the same measurable space and an event E,
P (E) +Q(EC) ≥ exp(−D (P ‖Q)).
Step 3: From Lemma 3, we get
D (Pπν1 ‖Pπν2) = Eπν1 [NK(T )]D (M(fK(0, I)) ‖M(fK(2∆, I)))
≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2Eπν1 [NK(T )]D (fK(0, I) ‖ fK(2∆, I))
≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2Eπν1 [NK(T )] (2∆2)
≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2 2T∆
2
K − 1 .
Hence, we get the regret bound to be
max{Reg(π, ν1, T ),Reg(π, ν2, T )} ≥ 1
2
(Reg(π, ν1, T ) + Reg(π, ν2, T ))
≥ T∆
4
exp
[
−min{2, eǫ}(eǫ − 1)2 2T∆
2
K − 1
]
.
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Step 4: Let us choose the optimality gap∆ to be
√
(K−1)
min{4,e2ǫ}(eǫ−1)2T ≤ 12 . This holds for any for
T ≥ (K−1)min{4,e2ǫ}(eǫ−1)2 , g(K, ǫ). Hence, by using the results of Step 3, we obtain:
Regminimax(T ) ≥
1
24
√
(K − 1)T
min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2 .
Corollary 1 Locally Private BayesianMinimax Regret Bound. Given an ǫ-locally private reward
generation mechanism with ǫ ∈ R, and a finite time horizon T ≥ g(K, ǫ), then for any environment
with bounded rewards r ∈ [0, 1]K , any algorithm π satisfies
Reg∗Bayes(T ) ≥
c
min{2, eǫ}(eǫ − 1)
√
(K − 1)T . (13)
Proof. Let us denote the space of all plausible priors for a given bandit problem to be L , {µ}.
Lattimore and Szepesvári (2019) proves in their recent paper that if L is the space of all finitely
supported probability measures on [0, 1]KT , the Bayesian regret and the minimax regret would be
the same.
Fact 1 Theorem 1 in (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2019). LetL be the space of all finitely supported
probability measures onRT , where R , [0, 1]K . Then
Regminimax(T ) = Reg
∗
Bayes(T ).
Since variance of bounded random variable in [0, 1] is less than 14 , the bounded reward assumption
satisfies the finite variance requirement of Theorems 1. Thus, the results of Theorems 1 and 1 prove
the statement of Corollary 1 for bounded rewards.
Theorem 2 Problem-dependent Local-Private Regret Bound. For any asymptotically consistent
bandit algorithm π, an environment ν with optimal reward distribution f∗, and an ǫ-locally private
reward generation mechanism, the expected cumulative regret
lim inf
T→∞
Reg(π, ν, T )
logT
≥
∑
a 6=a∗
∆a
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2D (fa ‖ f∗) .
Step 1 and Step 2 of this proof are similar in essence as that of Theorem 1. Step 3 differs from the fact
that rather than substituting the KL-divergence and the expected number of draws using the problem-
independent terms, we keep the problem dependent terms. This leads to a problem-dependent bound
in Step 4.
Proof. Step 1: Fix two environments ν1 and ν2 such that ν1 contains K reward distributions
{f1, . . . , fK} and ν2 contains K − 1 same reward distributions while the reward distribution i-th
arm fi is replaced by f
′
i such thatD (fi ‖ f ′i) ≤ D (fi ‖ f∗)+ δ for some δ > 0. Here, f∗ represents
the privatised reward distribution obtained for the optimal arm a∗. After imposing the ǫ-local private
mechanism, we obtain privatised reward distribution {g1, . . . , gi, . . . , gK} and {g1, . . . , g′i, . . . , gK}.
Let us denote the expected privatised rewards corresponding to the distributions as {µ1, . . . , µK}
and µ′i.
Step 2: We get the lower bounds of expected cumulative regret for a policy π, and the environments
ν1 and ν2 as follows:
Reg(π, ν1, T ) ≥ Pπν1 (N1(T ) ≤ T/2)
T
2
(µi − µ∗),
Reg(π, ν2, T ) > Pπν2 (N1(T ) > T/2)
T
2
(µ′i − µ∗).
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Let us denote the eventN1(T ) ≤ T/2 as E. Hence, we get
Reg(π, ν1, T ) + Reg(π, ν2, T ) ≥ T
2
(
Pπν1(E)(µi − µ∗) + Pπν2(EC)(µ′i − µ∗)
)
≥ T
2
(
Pπν1(E) + Pπν2(E
C)
)
min{(µi − µ∗), (µ′i − µ∗)}
≥
(a)
T
4
exp(−D (Pπν1 ‖Pπν2))min{(µi − µ∗), (µ′i − µ∗)}.
We obtain the inequality (a) from the Lemma 2.1 in (Bretagnolle and Huber, 1979) as mentioned in
the proof of Theorem 1.
Step 3: From Lemma 3, we get
D (Pπν1 ‖Pπν2) = Eπν1 [Ni(T )]D (gi ‖ g′i)
≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2Eπν1 [Ni(T )]D (fi ‖ f ′i)
≤ 2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2Eπν1 [Ni(T )] (D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ)
Hence, we get the regret bound to be
Reg(π, ν1, T ) + Reg(π, ν2, T )
≥ T
4
min{(µi − µ∗), (µ′i − µ∗)} exp
[−2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2Eπν1 [Ni(T )] (D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ)] .
Taking logarithm on both sides and simplifying, we get
Eπν1 [Ni(T )]
logT
≥ 1
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2(D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ)
log
(
T min{(µi−µ∗),(µ′i−µ∗)}
4(Reg(π,ν1,T )+Reg(π,ν2,T ))
)
logT
≥
1 +
log(0.25min{(µi−µ∗),(µ′i−µ∗)})
log T − log(Reg(π,ν1,T )+Reg(π,ν2,T ))log T
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2(D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ) .
Step 4: We obtain the asymptotic lower bound by taking limit inferior on both sides
lim inf
T→∞
Eπν1 [Ni(T )]
logT
≥ lim inf
T→∞
1 +
log(0.25min{(µi−µ∗),(µ′i−µ∗)})
log T − log(Reg(π,ν1,T )+Reg(π,ν2,T ))log T
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2(D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ)
=
1 + lim inf
T→∞
log(0.25min{(µi−µ∗),(µ′i−µ∗)})
log T − lim sup
T→∞
log(Reg(π,ν1,T )+Reg(π,ν2,T ))
log T
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2(D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ)
≥
(b)
1− p
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2(D (fi ‖ f∗) + δ)
≥
(c)
1
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2D (fi ‖ f∗) .
We obtain inequality (b) because:
1. The first limit contains a constant in the numerator. Thus the limit goes to 0 as T →∞.
2. In order to obtain the other limit. We use the asymptotic consistency property of π. Since
π is assumed to be asymptotically consistent, Reg(π, ν1, T ) + Reg(π, ν2, T ) ≤ CT p for some
constant p ∈ (0, 1) and large enough time horizon T . Thus, lim sup
T→∞
log(Reg(π,ν1,T )+Reg(π,ν2,T ))
log T ≤
lim sup
T→∞
p log T+logC
log T = p.
We obtain the inequality (c) from the fact that p > 0 and δ > 0.
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Step 5: Using the definition of regret and the resulting inequality of Step 4, we obtain
lim inf
T→∞
Reg(π, ν1, T )
logT
= lim inf
T→∞
∑
a 6=a∗
Eπν1 [Na(T )] (µa − µ∗)
logT
≥
∑
a 6=a∗
(µa − µ∗)
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2D (fa ‖ f∗)
=
∑
a 6=a∗
∆a
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2D (fa ‖ f∗) .
These results establish that for both minimax and Bayesian minimax regret the lower bounds degrade
by a multiplicative factor
1
min{2, eǫ}(eǫ − 1) whereas for problem-dependent lower bound degrades
by a multiplicative factor
1
2min{4, e2ǫ}(eǫ − 1)2 .
B.2 Proofs for Sequential Privacy
Lemma 4 Sequential Private KL-divergence Decomposition. For a sequentially private bandit
algorithm π satisfying l(T ) ≤ Eπν [Na(T )] for any arm a, and two environments ν1 and ν2,
D
(
P
T
πν1 ‖PTπν2
) ≤ 2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)1− 2e− Tl(T )
1− e− Tl(T )
+
K∑
a=1
Eν1 [Na(T )] (D (fa ∈ ν1 ‖ fa ∈ ν2)).
Proof Sketch. The second term of Lemma 2 remains the same. Whereas the first term is bounded as
follows:
T∑
t=1
D
(
π(At|Ht, ν1) ‖ π(At|Ht, ν2)
) ≤ T∑
t=1
max
At,Ht
∣∣π(At|Ht, ν1)∣∣
∣∣∣∣log π(At|Ht, ν1)π(At|Ht, ν2)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) max
At,Ht
T∑
t=1
∣∣π(At|Ht, ν1)∣∣
≤ 2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)1− 2e
− T
l(T )
1− e− Tl(T )
.
for E[Na(T )] ≥ l(T ) for all arms a.
Theorem 3 Sequential Private Minimax Regret Bound. Given a finite privacy level ǫ ≤ a/2, and
a time horizon T ≥ h(K, ǫ), then for any environment with finite variance, any algorithm π that is
ǫ-sequential private satisfies
Regminimax(T ) ≥ c(a)
√
(K − 1)T
2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) .
Proof Sketch. Repeat the Steps 1 and 2 described in the proof sketch of Theorem 1.
Step 3: Use Lemma 4 for KL-divergence decomposition under sequential privacy to obtain
D (Pπν1 ‖Pπν2) ≤ 2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) +
2T∆2
K − 1 .
Hence, we get the regret bound to be
max{Regν1(π, T ),Regν2(π, T )} ≥
1
2
(
Regν1(π, T ) + Regν2(π, T )
)
≥ T∆
4
exp
[
−2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)− 2T∆
2
K − 1
]
.
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Step 4: Let us choose the optimality gap∆ to be
∆ =
√
(K − 1)C(ǫ)
4ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)T ≤
1
2
.
Here, we choose
C(ǫ) = −2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)W
(
−e
−δ(a)+2ǫ(e2ǫ−1)
2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1)
)
,
where W is the Lambert function or the product-log function and δ(a) is a function of a such that
2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) ≤ δ(a) for ǫ ≤ a. In the given range of ǫ, C(ǫ) ≤ 1.
∆ being less than 12 holds for any for T ≥ 2(K−1)C(ǫ)4ǫ(e2ǫ−1) , h(K, ǫ). Hence, by combining the results
of Step 3 and the upper bound on privacy level ǫ ≤ a and T ≥ h(K, ǫ), we obtain:
Regminimax(T ) ≥
eδ(a)
4
√
2
√
(K − 1)T
min{2, eǫ}(e2ǫ − 1) . (14)
Corollary 2 Sequential Private Bayesian Minimax Regret Bound. Given a finite privacy level
ǫ ∈ R, and a finite time horizon T , then for any environment with bounded reward r ∈ [0, 1]K , any
algorithm π that is ǫ-sequential private satisfies
Reg∗Bayes(T ) ≥ c(ǫ)
√
(K − 1)T
2ǫ(e2ǫ − 1) .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 1, the results of Theorem 3 and Fact 1 prove the statement
of Corollary 2.
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